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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The improvement of international environmental regimes is a delicate science that is 
slowly being mastered through a complicated and costly process of trial and error.  Differences 
in regime effectiveness are influenced by multiple variables, including politics, regime structure, 
scope, and power and number of actors involved.  Only through comparison and analysis of 
different regimes and counterfactuals can the effectiveness of environmental treaties be 
determined.  In a world with no international authority to enforce compliance of international 
law, regime design is the only way to improve the environment on a global level.  Once 
evaluated, the specific parts of a regime that made it successful can be adopted and applied to 
future international agreements.   
The 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), and its successor in 1994, 
attempted to further conservation of tropical timber for the use of future generations.  As less 
developed countries do not have the monetary resources to conserve and properly manage their 
forests alone, tropical timber is slowly disappearing as these countries struggle to drive their 
economies forward, which degrades the environment in the process.  “The establishment of 
methods to manage tropical timber resources as renewable resources is essential to sustained 
economic improvement for much of the world’s population, as well as to halting the 
environmental damage caused by rapid deforestation” (Sand 1992, 105).  The ITTA attempted to 
slow further deforestation of tropical timber forests in producing member countries, and I will be 
researching whether this goal was actually met by either of the treaties, and if so, which was 
more effective and why.   
 The 1983 and 1994 ITTA’s will be evaluated on the conservation of producing nations’ 
tropical timber resources from 1990 to 2002.  Success will be measured by a decline in exports 
over the time period examined, implying a reduction in deforestation.  Worldwide tropical timber 
   2
data is only available from 1990 to 2002, which means that the effect the 1983 treaty had on 
tropical wood exports of member countries from entry into force in 1987 until 1989 can only be 
hypothesized.  As a result of this missing data, for this study the affects of the 1983 treaty will be 
attributed to any changes in tropical wood exports between 1990 and 1997, and any from 1997 to 
2002 to the 1994 agreement. The year 1997 is the point when a change in behavior as a result of 
the 1994 treaty can be seen as the 1994 treaty did not actually enter into force until 1997.  The 
main indicators of success of each treaty will be based on comparison of members to non-
members, and behavior before and after 1997.  Non-members will represent the counterfactual, 
or what would have happened if the treaty had never been negotiated.  My analysis will conclude 
that both the 1983 and the 1994 ITTA’s succeeded in fulfilling their objectives, but differences in 
regime structure and design made the 1994 agreement an improvement over the 1983 ITTA, and 
re-motivated member countries to conserve their tropical timber resources further.   
 
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
 The 1983 ITTA was signed in November 1983 and was scheduled to enter into force in 
1985.  “However, because of a dispute over the location of the Secretariat, which was finally 
given to Yokohama, Japan, the treaty did not begin operations until 1987” (Weiss 1998, 117).  
The treaty states that the agreement “shall remain in force for a period of five years after its entry 
into force unless the Council, by special vote, decides to extend, renegotiate or terminate it…” 
(1983 Treaty text Art.42).  The treaty did, in fact, remain in force for five years and was 
extended until 1992 when renegotiations began for the successor agreement (Weiss 1998, 118).  
Signatures of countries to the 1994 agreement began in 1994, but the treaty did not officially 
enter into force until January 1st, 1997 (Ecolex).   
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 In both treaties “Tropical timber” means “non-coniferous tropical wood for industrial 
uses, which grows or is produced in the countries situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the 
Tropic of Capricorn.  The term covers logs, sawn wood, veneer sheets and plywood” (Treaty text 
Art.2).  “Producing member” means “any country with tropical forest resources and/or a net 
exporter of tropical timber…” (Treaty text Art.2).  The International Tropical Timber Council is 
the highest organizational body under the agreements and is in charge of dealing with all matters 
related to the implementation and enforcement of the agreements. 
 
GOALS 
Treaties lay out specific goals or objectives, normally towards the beginning of the 
document, that the member countries desire to meet upon enforcement.  The ITTA’s are unique 
in that they both attempt sustainable development in the tropical timber market by encouraging 
market benefits, as well as environmental preservation.  This investigation, however, will be 
environmentally focused.  The specific objectives that I have chosen to focus on in the 1983 
treaty are the commitment of the members: 
• To encourage conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources 
• To ensure greater transparency in the international tropical timber market 
 
The specific objectives that I have chosen to focus on in the 1994 treaty are the commitment of 
the members: 
• To achieve exports of tropical timber products from sustainably managed sources by the year 
2000 
• To ensure greater transparency in the international tropical timber market 
• Provide developing countries with financial resources to enable them to sustainably manage, 
conserve and develop their tropical forests 
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 Both treaties identify the conservation of tropical forests, and increased transparency in 
the international timber market as main objectives (1983 Art1, 1994 Art1).  The 1994 agreement 
goes even further by setting a specific date for the achievement of sustainable forest practices in 
producing member nations, as well as setting up a fund to assist them in achieving this goal.  “In 
the new treaty, countries producing tropical timber agree to try to export wood only from 
sustainably managed forests by the year 2000.  In return, consumer countries agreed to establish 
a new fund, the Bali Partnership Fund, to help producer countries meet the objective of 
sustainably managed forests” (Weiss 1998, 119). 
 The goals and texts of the two treaties are practically identical, apart from the goal for 
sustainable forest practices and the Bali Partnership Fund.  The renegotiations of the ITTA in 
1992 were building upon an already successful treaty by making it more environmentally 
explicit.  “…an international commodity agreement designed to facilitate trade, stimulated 
greater environmental awareness and provided a forum for negotiating a new, more 
environmentally friendly treaty” (Weiss 1998, 119).  The objectives and structure of the 1994 
agreement are very similar to the 1983 agreement as a result of its success.  If the 1983 ITTA had 
been unsuccessful the 1994 agreement would have approached the problem in a different 
manner, however this was not the case.  The 1994 agreement helped re-invigorate the 
commitment of member parties to conserve their tropical timber resources by setting a more 
tangible goal and aiding them in achieving this goal.  I will argue that these goals: greater market 
transparency, improved tropical forest conservation, and sustainable management of tropical 
forests in producing countries, were improved by the implementation of the two treaties more 
than would have been otherwise. 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The main dependent variable in the evaluation of whether the ITTA’s had an impact on 
the deforestation in member countries will be represented in my analysis by tropical timber 
exports.  An increase in exports would imply an increase in deforestation, while a decrease 
would imply the opposite.  In order to explain if any changes in exports of member countries had 
to do with the enforcement of the treaty, members will be compared to non-members.    
 
HYPOTHESES  
It could be argued that to effectively evaluate the disappearance of tropical forests, 
deforestation rates should be analyzed, not tropical wood exports.  Conceptually, deforestation is 
what is cared about on an environmental level, but exports are the observable way to evaluate 
this problem.  Deforestation rates are values that are estimated and there is no real way to 
distinguish whether the deforestation rate applies to all forests in a country, or just tropical 
forests, as the combination of the two is common.  By examining just tropical wood exports, the 
exact resource that the ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization) is attempting to 
manage can be evaluated. 
Considering that the main environmental goal of both of the ITTA’s is to conserve 
tropical forests, exports would be expected to decline after the implementation of the treaties.  
Without the treaties it can be hypothesized that countries would have continued cutting down 
their forests at the same rate as before in an effort to continue making monetary gains.  Table 1 is 
a graph of what would have ideally occurred after the implementation of the two treaties.   
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The cutting down of forests would likely have gotten worse before it got better, decreasing 
slowly as new sustainable methods of logging were adopted by member countries, and then 




 Eight members are compared to eight non-members in the study, and include countries 
from Latin America, Africa, and Asia: members being Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea.  The non-
members are: Cambodia, The Central African Republic, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, 
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Nigeria and Vietnam.  By examining a large group of members compared to non-members the 
variation in variables that separate one nation from another are averaged across the eight nations, 
so they can be eliminated as having an effect.  All countries in the study are developing nations, 
which helps to keep important economic differences constant.  Most conclusions will be drawn 
from data comparing all member states to all non-members, however Malaysia, and the Ivory 
Coast will be individually analyzed.  Malaysia is one of the world’s largest tropical wood 
exporters, and the Ivory Coast is the biggest supplier in Africa, and was the most reluctant 
country to sign the agreements (Gowers 1985).  This means that Malaysia was the “pusher” 
during negotiations while the Ivory Coast was the “dragger” of the member countries, implying 
that they are the actor least likely to comply, and an analysis of their behavior can truly prove 
whether the treaty was effective at changing behavior or not. 
 
TROPICAL TIMBER EXPORTS 
MEMBERS VS. NON-MEMBERS 
 As stated above, tropical timber export data has only been documented since 1990; 
therefore earlier patterns in exports can only be hypothesized.  Differences in members compared 
to non-members from 1990 to 1996 will show whether the 1983 agreement made a difference, 
and from 1997 to 2002 the 1994 ITTA was in force.  The non-member graph represents the 
counterfactual, or, what hypothetically would have happened worldwide if the ITTA had not 
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 After a climax in 1992, member exports are constantly descending over the time period, 
showing that the treaties in fact achieved what was hypothesized they would.  Environmental 
problems tend to get worse for a couple of years before they get better after the implementation 
of a new treaty, as it takes time to enforce the new ways of logging, for example, in the case of 
the ITTA.  Exports increased after implementation of the first treaty, and then slowly decreased, 
and continued doing so after 1997.  The treaties therefore decreased deforestation of tropical 
timber forests of members.  From 1994-1996 when non-members were increasing their exports, 
members were exporting much less than they would have otherwise.  By looking at the graphs 
both members and non-members have the same general trends after 1997: decreasing in 1997, 
increasing slightly until 2001, and decreasing again.  The non-members have more dramatic 
increases and decreases, however, proving that despite a world decrease in demand for tropical 
timber exports, the 1994 agreement was successful at getting members to export less than they 
would have otherwise. 
   












































































































Reference table 3. 
 Of all of the member countries evaluated, Malaysia was the most compliant and 
progressive in taking steps to improve the environmental situation in the country regarding 
tropical timber.  “In its mid-term review in 1996, only three countries were identified as having 
potential of achieving the Year 2000 Objective.  They were Ghana, Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Following the wrath of regional currency crises and economic downturn in 1997, the number had 
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been reduced to one country, that is, Malaysia” (Business Times Malaysia 1999).  Malaysia’s 
exports decreased over the time period, showing that with full compliance Malaysia decreased 
their deforestation of tropical timber. 
 Despite being the leading pusher during negotiations of the ITTA’s, Malaysia was hit in 
the late 1990’s by the Asian Financial Crisis.  Their decline in exports is thus even more 
impressive because when a country is struggling financially it is more likely to do anything it can 
to make monetary gains.  Malaysia was in need of boosting its economy, but complied with the 
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IVORY COAST 
Reference table 4. 
 The Ivory Coast ratified the 1994 ITTA January 1st 1997, the date of entry into force, 
proving their reluctance in become a member (Ecolex).  Malaysia, on the other hand, ratified 
eagerly on the first of March, 1995.  However, despite the Ivory Coast’s reluctance in signing the 
ITTA’s, its behavior matches that of the other complying member countries.  This proves that 
even the “dragger” of the member countries showed improvement in reducing tropical timber 
exports.  The treaties were a success in changing the behavior of both the willing and unwilling. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent variables that would have an affect on tropical timber exports are: 
population, world market timber prices, transparency in the international timber market, the 
treaties themselves and their differences, and change in sustainable forest management practices.  
Through the evaluation of these independent variables it can be concluded whether the treaties, 
or some other variable, had an impact on the export of tropical timber from member countries.  
In order to look at overall differences between members and non-members most of the following 
charts compare all of the members to all of the non-members.  The following analysis will show 
that the treaties succeeded in improving transparency on the international timber market, 
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RIVAL HYPOTHESES 
POPULATION 
 Overpopulation is a problem in most developing countries of the world today.  This has 
been a challenge for the ITTO as the more people there are in a country, the more mouths there 
are to feed, and therefore the environment is more likely to be misused to support a growing 
population.  In member country Cameroon, for example, “future population growth (from an 
estimated 12.5 million in 1994 to possibly 17 million by the year 2000) will substantially 
increase the demand for both land to cultivate and fuelwood, thereby placing additional pressure 
on the forest…In turn, this will have profound implications for the implementation of and 
compliance with the ITTA” (Weiss 1998, 439-440).  Although population does create problems 
for the ITTA’s, growing population cannot be used to explain the difference in tropical timber 
exports between members and non-members, as population is increasing each year in both 
groups.  Reference table 5.  
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Therefore as population increases in all countries in the study the difference in exports between 
members and non-members cannot be explained by growing population.  Population can 
therefore be eliminated as an independent variable that contributed to the decrease in tropical 
timber exports. 
 
WORLD MARKET TIMBER PRICES 
 World market timber prices do have an affect on the amount of timber exported by each 
country, however it cannot explain the difference in exports between members and non-
members.  This is because all tropical timber exporters, members and non, are affected equally 
by world market timber prices.  Although price is very closely related to exports, it cannot 
explain the difference between members and non-members.  It can, however, help explain the 
reluctance of member countries to sign the treaty. 
 The large debate that surrounded the negotiations of the ITTA’s was the concern of 
producing countries that new environmental standards for tropical timber would make tropical 
timber less competitive on the world market as the price would increase.  Producing nations 
argued that the treaty should cover all types of wood to eliminate market discrimination, 
however, developing countries won the battle and the ITTA became a treaty that only covered 
tropical timber.  This economic disappointment for producing nations was a victory for 
environmentalists as the overall decline in exports in member and non-member nations can 
somewhat be attributed to the forced rise in price that members had to incur to pay the difference 
of their new environmentally-friendly forest management practices.   
 
 
   14
TRANSPARENCY 
 Both ITTA’s aimed to increase transparency in the international tropical timber market.  
Regime transparency is “the availability of regime-relevant information” or “information 
regarding the operation and impact of a regime” (Mitchell 1998, 110).  Accurate tropical timber 
export data not only helps to increase market knowledge, but also makes export data available to 
the public, which in turn encourages countries not to over export.  If exports are extremely high 
in a particular country, NGO’s and environmentalists can draw media attention to the behavior of 
that country.  “To effectively alter the behavior of states and substate actors, regimes (or the 
states that compose them) must either have-or create-information about the activities they seek to 
regulate and the impact of those activities on the ultimate goals of the regime” (Mitchell 1998, 
111).  The existence of worldwide tropical timber trade data is a result of the work of the ITTO 
and the Council’s dedication to compiling statistical data.  Tropical timber data was not even 
available before 1990, but is now kept track of yearly as a result of the ITTA’s.   
One of the major ITTO tasks is to compile statistical data on the trade in tropical woods.  The 
ITTO publishes an Annual Review and Assessment of the World’s Tropical Timber Situation, 
which is prepared by the secretariat and reviewed by a joint session of the three permanent 
committees (Weiss 1998, 121). 
 
Although some of the data is based on estimates (Weiss 1998, 121), the improvement in the 
existence of market data is a direct result of the ITTA’s.  As a result of the ITTA transparency 
has improved somewhat even in non-member tropical producing countries, but on a much 
smaller scale compared to member nations.  Therefore members felt much more pressure than 
non-members did to report their tropical timber exports and decreased their exports more 
dramatically than non-members.  The improvement in transparency of international timber 
market was a goal that was successfully met by both of the ITTA’s.  Regime transparency was an 
   15
independent variable that played a key role in getting member countries to decrease their tropical 
timber exports more than they would have otherwise. 
  
DIFFERENCES IN REGIME STRUCTURE 
 The changes made to the 1994 treaty made it much more environmentally explicit by 
setting the goal of achieving sustainably managed resources by the year 2000, while the 1983 
ITTA was more trade and market oriented.  Though trade and economic factors were still of 
concern in the 1994 treaty, the environment was made a larger priority.  The structure of the 
1983 ITTA improved in two key ways after renegotiations: the creation of the Bali Partnership 
fund to assist producing countries in managing their tropical timber resources, and the explicit 
goal for sustainable forest practices to be met by the year 2000.  Much of the rest of the 1994 
treaty text is identical to that of the 1983 treaty, considering that the 1994 agreement was 
improving an already good regime.   
 Both of the agreements are divided into producing and consuming countries of tropical 
timber, the former of which are generally third world economies, the latter first world.  “More 
than 75 percent of the world's tropical timber output is produced by 24 of ITTO's 51-member 
countries, while the remaining 27 are consuming nations accounting for more than 95 percent of 
the world's tropical wood imports” (United Press International 1996).  The ITTO succeeded in 
getting almost all of the actors involved in tropical timber trade to join the treaty “…the ITTO 
has succeeded in achieving almost comprehensive membership among producing and consuming 
countries” (Sand 1992, 106).  The differences in regime structure of the 1994 ITTA re-
invigorated members by giving them a monetary incentive to want to improve their tropical 
timber logging practices. 
 




Reference table 6. 
Table 6: Sustainable Management 
 
Forest Area Under Management Plans: 1980, 1990, 2000 
 
 
Country/area Forest area 2000 Area under forest management plans  
  2000  1990  1980  
 000 ha 000 ha % 000 ha % 000 ha % 
ITTA Members        
Cameroon 23 858 - - - - - - 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 135 207 - - - - - - 
Ecuador 10 557 14 n.s - - - - 
Indonesia 104 986 72* n.ap. - - 40 n.s. 
Ivory Coast 7 117 1 387 19 - - 1 1 
Liberia 3 481 - - - - - - 
Malaysia 19 292 14 020 73 - - 2 499 12 
Papua New Guinea 30 601 5 341 17 - - n.s. n.s. 
        
ITTA Non Members        
Cambodia 9 335 - - - - - - 
Central African Republic 22 907 269* n.ap. - - - - 
Fiji 815 - - - - - - 
Guinea 6 929 112* n.ap. - - - - 
Guinea-Bissau 2 187 - - - - - - 
Lao People's Dem. Rep 12 561 - - - - - - 
Nigeria 13 517 832* n.ap. - - n.s. n.s. 
Viet Nam 9 819 - - - - - - 
 
Note: n.s means non-significative, meaning that the forest area under management is too small to 
be accounted for. 
 
Note 2: n. ap. means that a percentage could not be calculated because the figure is not a total 
national figure, as shown by the asterix note. 
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 This chart shows forest areas that are operating under a sustainable management 
program.  The goal of the 1994 treaty was to achieve all exports of tropical timber products from 
sustainably managed sources by the year 2000.  This somewhat unrealistic goal was not fully met 
by any of the countries, though improvements were definitely made.  Overall, members have 
more protected areas than non-members, five of the eight members have forests under 
management in 2000, while only three of the non-members have forests under management in 
the same year.  The Central African Republic and Malaysia have similar forest areas, however in 
2000 The Central African Republic has an estimated 269 hectares under management, while 
Malaysia has 14,020.  Overall, however, the achievement of having all producing countries 
operating under sustainable forest management practice was unrealistic, and not met.  “In the 
end, achieving sustainability in forest management practices will be a continuing process among 
producer members rather than merely meeting the Year 2000 Objective” (Business Times 
Malaysia 1999).  This is a goal that can be improved, but the advancements that were made were 
a result of the ITTA’s.   
 The way these advancements were made was through projects funded and organized by 
the ITTO that were initially proposed during 1983 negotiations, and further strengthened over the 
1990’s, and sought to include actors outside of the ITTO.   
To strengthen the project proposals presented, in 1989 the Council authorized the establishment of 
the Expert Panels for Technical Appraisal of Project Proposals, which may include representatives 
from both the permanent committees and NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund.  In 1992 the 
Council decided to publish manuals to assist in formulating projects and in project monitoring, 
review, and evaluation (Weiss 1998, 121). 
 
Through the implementation of these projects in producing countries, the advancements that 
were made in sustainable forest practices were made possible.  
 Often utopian goals are set by treaties, and though it is understood that they are not 
realistically attainable, just giving countries a target to strive towards improves the environment.  
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Sustainable forest management in all member countries by the year 2000 set forth in the 1994 
treaty was one of these kind of goals.  Though this objective was not met by the member 
countries, more sustainable forest management programs were put in place than would have been 




 Treaties are more likely to change behavior when conditions to do so are favorable; 
however, the true test of an environmental regime comes when in spite of unfavorable conditions 
for compliance, members change behavior.  When a country already has incentives and the 
ability to comply with a treaty, improvement is relatively easy to achieve.  The power and 
objectives of actors involved with each situation complicates full compliance.  In the case of the 
ITTO it was the power and objectives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that truly put 
the treaty to the test.  Although the goals of the IMF’s forestry conservation program seemed 
similar to those of the ITTA’s, the IMF actually had disguised intentions.  
 The IMF is an international organization that “was established to promote international 
monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster 
economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance 
to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment” (IMF mission statement).  The 
Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) was a program implemented by the IMF to “support 
tropical forest conservation” (Rich 1990, 190), which began in 1989 and continued into the 
1990’s.  The goals of the TFAP were  
…to alleviate pressures causing deforestation in the Third World by mobilizing $8 billion from 
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies over a five-year period for a variety of forestry and 
agricultural activities that included the building of forestry and environmental institutions, supply 
of fuelwood needs, conservation of protected areas and vulnerable watershed regions, and support 
of forest management for industrial uses (Rich 1990, 190).   
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The supposed goals of the IMF project were very similar to that of the ITTA but with a much 
larger budget.  The ITTA had a $3.9 million budget in 1994 (Weiss 1998, 91) which pales in 
comparison to the TFAP’s $8 billion dollar limit.  The difference was that the ITTA used its 
budget to improve the environment, while the IMF did just the opposite. 
 An extensive study was done to review the effects of the TFAP, led by the World 
Rainforest Movement.  The study found that “the forestry investment proposed would 
dramatically accelerate the rate of deforestation through increased logging; in no instance was it 
found that these investments would actually reduce deforestation” (Rich 1990, 191).  A case 
study helps put the actions of the IMF into context.  In January of 1989 the IMF approved $23 
million of the TFAP’s budget for a forestry and fisheries plan in Guinea, a non-member of the 
ITTA.  An investigation by the World Wildlife Fund International found that  
 
…the so called “forest management and protection” component of the project actually amounts to 
a deforestation scheme: the Bank’s money will help support the construction of 45 miles of roads 
in or around two humid forest reserves totaling 150,000 hectares, of which some 106,000 hectares 
are still pristine rainforest.  Worse, hidden in the fine print of the “management and protection” 
section of the Bank’s project document is its real thrust: two thirds of the remaining 106,000 
hectares of rainforest are to be opened for timber production (Rich 1990, 191). 
 
The outcome of the IMF’s aid to Guinea to increase deforestation can be seen on the graph of its 
exports.  Reference table 7. Instead of decreasing over the time period and leveling off with 
lower tropical timber exports as the members of the ITTA did, Guinea increases dramatically 
over the time period, leveling off at a much higher volume of exports.  The IMF causes countries 





















Only through an analysis of both a member and a non-member can an accurate 
counterfactual be hypothesized.  Cameroon and Guinea are geographically similar central 
African nations.  Both received aid from the IMF through the TFAP, however, Cameroon was a 
member of the ITTA while Guinea was not.  Cameroon’s exports were increasing dramatically 
before 1997, just like Guinea, and then declined enormously after 1997, entry into force of the 
1994 agreement.  Reference table 8. 
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Cameroon was giving in to the deforestation-encouraging practices of the IMF in the beginning, 
but with the implementation of the revised treaty its behavior changed dramatically.  This is an 
example of how the 1994 ITTA re-invigorated member countries to want to improve their 
environments.  The true strength of the ITTA is demonstrated because even when the IMF was 
active in Cameroon the objectives of the ITTO won over those of the IMF. 
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 This study has argued that the work of the ITTA’s is what caused a larger decrease in 
deforestation of member countries compared to non-members from 1990 to 2002.  However, 
alternate explanations must be examined as possible contributors to the decline as well.  Forest 
coverage and a decrease in demand for tropical wood are two variables that could have 
contributed to the decline in forest exports as well. 
 
FOREST COVERAGE 
 Forest coverage in a country is proportionately related to the amount of tropical timber 
exported.  Both member and non-member tropical timber exports are generally decreasing over 
the time period, despite differences in fluctuations.  Forest coverage for all actors is always 
decreasing as well.  Reference table 9. 
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The overall decline of member and non-member exports must be somewhat attributed to 
the fact that the amount of timber that can be cut down is decreasing.  All nations included in this 
study are not replanting their forests at the same rate they are logging them, rather at a slower 
one.  A discrepancy in data makes this a difficult variable to evaluate as forest coverage data 
covers all forests in a country, not just tropical forests.  It can be assumed, however, that if all 
forests were declining, the percentage of tropical forests were as well.  The treaty, however, kept 
members from cutting their tropical timber down as fast as non-members did.  Forests are 




 Consumers in today’s world are constantly looking to get the best return on their 
investment.  As new environmental restrictions were put on tropical timber, and exports 
decreased, the price of tropical timber increased dramatically after implementation of the 
ITTA’s.  Tropical timber is exotic and expensive normally, and became more so as a result of the 
treaties.  For example in Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) “The forest resources 
of the region are also one of the richest and most valuable in the tropical world. Asean is the 
home of the luxury timber teak, tectona grandis. The so-called south-sea timbers, the lauans and 
merantis, are valued internationally” (Freezailah 1996).  These unique costly timbers are desired 
less and less as manufacturers adopt cheaper alternatives.  The decline in demand is another 
possible explanation for the overall decline in tropical timber exports. 
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GOAL EVALUATION 
 The main environmental goal of the ITTA’s - conservation of forests in producing 
member countries - was met, and greater transparency in the tropical timber market, an increase 
in funds for producing countries put forth in the 1994 agreement, were accomplished as well.  
Despite cumbersome advancement in the goal to sustainably manage producing members 
tropical forests, the little progress that was made can be attributed to the creation of the Bali 
Partnership Fund that was an addition to the 1994 agreement.  Lack of progress and participation 
of producing nations in the 1983 agreement was attributed largely to funding.  “There is no 
provision in the (1983) ITTA to assist developing countries in bearing the expense of sending 
delegates to meetings and working parties, in order to play a more proactive role in directing 
ITTO policies” (Sand 1992, 109). The new fund gave producing countries more of an 
incentive to want to participate and improve forest management, and re-invigorated their drive to 
conserve their tropical timber resources.  “Consumers have also agreed to set up a fund, known 
as the 'Bali Partnership Fund', to aid producers in their efforts to meet forest conservation 
objectives” (Williams 1994).  Giving countries, especially developing countries, a monetary 




 In this study I compared tropical wood exports of members to non-members taking into 
account, population, world market timber price, transparency, difference in regime structure, and 
sustainable forest management practices, as independent variables that could effect my 
dependent variable, tropical timber exports, from 1990 to 2002.  The role of the IMF as a 
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powerful actor in the conservation of tropical timber was discussed and forest coverage and 
decreasing demand were also examined as possible alternate explanations for the decrease in 
tropical timber exports.  However, after careful examination of each variable it can be concluded 
that as a result of the changes of the ITTA’s, member countries exported less tropical timber than 
they would have otherwise, implying a decrease in deforestation rates.   
 Unfortunately, treaties that are solely environmentally focused are unrealistic in a world 
that is driven by trade and markets.  The 1983 ITTA decreased deforestation in producing 
member countries, and increased market transparency.  The 1994 agreement built upon its 
success and improved what had already been accomplished by the 1983 ITTA with the creation 
of the Bali Partnership Fund and a goal for sustainable forest management practices.   
 A common theory in international environmental politics is that the more actors there are 
involved in an environmental treaty, the more difficult it is to enforce compliance.  This theory 
proved not to be true in the case of the ITTA’s.  By including both consuming and producing 
countries of tropical wood, the treaty was able to focus on all aspects of the international market, 
not just economic or environmental, but both.  From an environmental perspective the ITTA’s 
were a success.   
 The tropical timber industry is a difficult sector to monitor, as changes become very 
political in countries where economies benefit from environmental degradation.  “In many 
forest-rich countries, land tenure regimes, government forestry agencies, timber concession 
policies, and taxes and subsidies related to forest land and forest products all serve to strengthen 
vested interests that benefit from forest exploitation” (Dubash 1999, 2).  Despite these obstacles, 
the ITTA’s were able to change logging practices in member countries and helped to preserve 
tropical timber for future generations. 
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